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Treaty
of Paris
September 3rd, 1783
By: Stanley L. Klos
Courtesy of: National Archives and Records Administration
Treaty of Paris: Signed by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay
In an effort to minimize the importance of France in guaranteeing U.S. Independence, David Hartley the British Commissioner agreed to the American suggestion to negotiate a separate treaty without France or Spain. On the morning of September 3rd, 1783 Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay, met privately with John Hartley in his rooms at the Hotel de York and signed a treaty entitled, "The Definitive Treaty of Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America." The Treaty was immediately dispatched to the United States Congress as Article Ten required ratification and the exchange of originals within six months.
Click Here to see the table that served for the signing of the Treaty of Paris which, formally established American Independence from Great Britain.
Elias Boudinot, under whose term the treaty was initially signed by the commissioners, never have the opportunity to sign this document as it arrived in America after Thomas Mifflin had been elected President of the United States. Most historians credit Elias Boudinot with the Presidential signing of the Definitive Treaty of Peace but it was actually Thomas Mifflin who ratified the document with King George III in 1784. Other then this little known fact, the treaty was substantially negotiated and completed in its final form under Boudinot’s term.
On the fall of Lord North's ministry in March 1782, Franklin sent a letter to his friend, Lord Shelburne, expressing a hope that peace might soon be made. When the letter reached London, the new ministry, in which Shelburne was then Secretary of State for home and colonies, had already been formed. Secretary Shelburne, with the approval of the cabinet, replied by dispatching to Paris an agent to talk with Franklin informally to determine the terms upon which the Americans would make peace. The person chosen for this purpose was Richard Oswald, a Scottish merchant of frank disposition and open-minded views.
In April there were several conversations between Oswald and Franklin. The most noteworthy point Franklin made was that in order to make a durable peace the nations must remove all occasions for future quarrel. The line of frontier between New York and Canada was populated by a lawless set of men, who in time of peace would be likely to breed trouble between their respective governments. Franklin articulated that it would be wise for England to cede Canada to the United States. A similar reasoning was also used for Nova Scotia in their initial meetings. Fraanklin furthered reasoned that by ceding these lands to the United States, it would be possible from their sale, to indemnify the Americans for all losses of private property during the war, and also to make reparation to the Tories whose estates had been confiscated. By pursuing such a policy, England, which had made war on America unjustly, and had wantonly done it great injuries, would achieve not merely peace, but reconciliation with America, and reconciliation, said Franklin, is "a sweet word."
This was an exceptionally bold tone for Franklin to take but he knew that almost every member of the Whig ministry had publicly articulated the opinion that the war against America was unjust and wanton. Benjamin Franklin who was a shrewd hand at a bargain masterfully set his terms sky high. Oswald, surprisingly, seemed to have been convinced by Franklin's reasoning, and expressed neither surprise nor reluctance at the idea of ceding Canada. The main points of this meeting were noted upon a sheet of paper, which Franklin permitted Oswald to take to London and show to Lord Shelburne, first writing upon it an express “declaration” of its informal character.
On receiving this memorandum, Shelburne did not show it to the cabinet, but returned it to Franklin without any immediate answer, after keeping it only one night. Oswald was presently sent back to Paris empowered as commissioner to negotiate with Franklin. Oswald carried Shelburne's answer to the memorandum that desired the cession of Canada addressing Franklin’s three main points. The message was terse:
1. By way
of reparation. -- Answer: No reparation can be heard of.
2. To prevent future wars. -- Answer: It is to be hoped that some more
friendly method will be found.
3. As a fund of indemnification to loyalists. -- Answer: No independence to be
acknowledged without their being taken care of.
Shelburne added that “the Americans would be expected to make some compensation for the surrender of Charleston, Savannah, and the City of New York, still held by British troops.”
From this it appears that Shelburne, as well as Franklin, knew how to begin by asking more than he was likely to get. England was no more likely to listen to a proposal for ceding Canada than the Americans were to listen to the suggestion of compensating the British for surrendering New York. But there can be little doubt that the bold stand thus taken by Franklin at the outset, together with the influence he exerted over Oswald, contributed materially to the dazzling success of the American negotiations.
With the formal appointment of a British Commissioner the negotiations of the initiative passed almost entirely out of Benjamin Franklin’s hands as his colleagues, John Jay and John Adams took over the talks with Great Britain. The form that the treaty took was mainly the work of Jay and Adams. The services of Franklin were chiefly valuable at the beginning, and again, to some extent, at the end.
There were two grave difficulties in making a treaty. The first was that France was really hostile to the American claims. She sought to see the country between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi divided between England and Spain. France had hoped that England would have the region north of the Ohio, and the region south of it to remain an Indian territory under the protectorate of Spain. French were willing to concede a narrow strip on the western slope of the Alleghenies, over which the United States would be permitted to excise protectorship. In other words, France wished to confine the United States to the east of the Alleghenies and prevent their expansion westward into what would be later known as the Louisiana Purchase. France also sought to exclude the United States from all share in the fisheries, in order to prevent the new nation from becoming a great naval power. France was an ally only up to a certain point and this antagonism of interests made joint negotiations extremely difficult.
The second difficulty was the unwillingness of the British government to acknowledge the independence of the United States as a condition that must precede all negotiation. The Americans remained firm upon this point, as they had insisted on it ever since the Staten Island conference in 1776. England was determined, however, to withhold the recognition long enough so they could utilize it as a bargaining chip in the treaty negotiations. This difficulty was enhanced by the fact that, if this point were conceded to the Americans, it would transfer the conduct of the treaty from the colonial secretary, Shelburne, to the Foreign Secretary Charles James Fox. These two British politicians not only differed widely in their views of the situation, but were personally bitter enemies.
Presently Fox heard of the private memorandum that Shelburne had received from Franklin but had not shown to the cabinet. Fox concluded, quite wrongly, that Shelburne was playing a secret part for purposes of his own. Accordingly, Secretary Fox made up his mind to utilize all the political means necessary to get the American negotiations transferred to his own department. In the cabinet meeting, on the last day of June, Secretary Fox moved that the independence of the United States should be unconditionally acknowledged by Great Britain. This way, he argued, England could treat the United States as a foreign power. The motion was lost, and Fox prepared to resign his office. As fate would have it the very next day the death of Lord Rockingham broke up the ministry. Lord Shelburne now became Prime Minister and this coupled with two British Naval Victories simplified the problem of separating the French from the negotiations. In April the French fleet under the command of Admiral De Grasse, who blocked the naval relief of Cornwallis at Yorktown a 9 months earlier, was annihilated by British Admiral Rodney in the West Indies. In September this victory was followed by the total defeat of the combined French and Spanish forces at Gibraltar. This seriously altered Treaty negotiations with the United States as France and Spain were in no longer in a position to challenge Britain’s superior naval force.
England, though stalemated in America, was victorious over France and Spain who were the U.S.’s most important allies. The acknowledged object, for which France had entered into alliance with the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United States. With Victory at Yorktown and a war weary British public this point was now substantially gained by France. The chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar. With the combined naval defeats there was now little hope of accomplishing this, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty.
French Foreign Minister Vergennes now tried to satisfy Spain at the expense of the United States. He sent a secret envoy under an assumed name to Prime Minister Shelburne seeking the development of a plan for dividing the Mississippi valley between England and Spain. This was discovered by John Jay, who counteracted it by sending a messenger of his own to Lord Shelburn. The British Prime Minister instantly recognized that a rift had arisen between the allies.
It now became strikingly clear that it would be and advantage to England and the United States to carry on their negotiations without the intervention of France. England had always preferred to make concessions to the Americans rather than to the house of Bourbon while he United States wanted control of the Northwest Territory which was being blocked by France. By first detaching the United States from the alliance, Britain could proceed to cudgel France and Spain out of expanding their empires in America. There was an obstacle in the way of a separate negotiation. The chevalier Luzerne, the French minister at Philadelphia, had been busy with congress, and that body had sent instructions to its commissioners at Paris to be guided in all things by the wishes of the French court. Former President John Jay upon receiving these orders was adamant against including France into the negotiations. After making a case to his fellow commissioners that the congressional directive should be ignored, John Adams side with former President John Jay despite Franklin’s insistence they remain bound to the resolution. Together the two commissioners overruled Benjamin Franklin and agreed to take all the responsibility of disregarding these instructions. The provisions of the treaty, so marvelously favorable to the Americans, were set by John Jay and John Adams in separate negotiations with England.
In the arrangement of the provisions, Benjamin Franklin played an important part, especially in driving the British commissioners from their position with regard to the compensation of loyalists. After a long struggle upon this point, Franklin observed that, “if the loyalists were to be indemnified, it would be necessary also to reckon up the damage they had done in burning villages and shipping, and then strike a balance between the two accounts" and he grimly suggested that a special commission might be appointed for this purpose. It was now getting late in the autumn and Shelburne felt it to be a political necessity to bring the negotiation to an end before the assembling of parliament. At the prospect of endless discussion, which Franklin's special commission proposal involved, the British commissioners gave way and accepted the American terms. It was now up to Franklin to lay the matter before French Foreign Minister in such a manner to avoid a fracture of the cordial relations between America and France. It was a delicate matter for in dealing separately with the English government, the Americans laid them open to the charge of having committed a breach of diplomatic courtesy and complete disregard to the direct orders of The President of the United States and Congress Assembled. Benjamin Franklin managed the disclosure of the Treaty to the French with entire success.
On the part of the Americans the treaty of 1783 is still hailed as one of the most brilliant triumphs in the whole history of modern diplomacy. Had the affair been managed by men of everyday ability, the greatest results of the war would probably have been lost. The new republic would have been cooped up between the Atlantic and the Alleghenies. A national westward expansion would have been impossible without further warfare with England. Most importantly, the formation of a Federal Republic with no opportunity for territorial expansion would have muted many of the voices who formed the constitutional convention in 1787.
To the grand triumph the wide-ranging talents of Franklin, Adams, and Jay equally contributed to the accomplishments of the treaty. To John Jay is due the credit of detecting and baffling the sinister designs of France and persuading John Adams to contradict the orders of the President and Congress. Without the tact of Franklin, however, this probably could not have been accomplished without offending France who could have easily vetoed the Treaty with by rattling her military saber. The United States now had her Independence from a treaty that begins “In the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity.” Perhaps the three men who this author admires most were indeed on the case of “The Definitive Treaty of Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America.”
